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Abstract
International comparisons show that countries with co-ordinated wage
setting generally have lower unemployment than countries with less co-
ordinated wage setting. This paper argues that the monetary regime may
affect whether co-ordination among many wage setters is feasible. A strict
monetary regime, like a country-specific inflation target, to some extent
disciplines wage setters, so that the consequences of uncoordinated
wage setting are less detrimental than under a more passive monetary
regime (eg a monetary union). Thus, the gains from co-ordination are
larger under a passive regime. Under some circumstances a passive
regime may induce co-operation in wage setting, and thus lower
unemployment, when a stricter regime would not.
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1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, explanations of the high European unemployment have increasingly 
focused on the structure of the labour market. The wage formation system has played a key 
role in many of the explanations. An important view, advocated by among others Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman (1991), is that strong unions per se have a negative impact on 
employment, by increasing wage pressure. Yet if wage setters co-ordinate their wage setting, 
taking into consideration the negative external effects identified in the literature (cf. surveys 
in Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel, 1993, and Calmfors, 1993), the negative impact of unions 
may be mitigated. Indeed, the findings of several international comparisons (e.g. Nickell, 
1997, OECD, 1997, Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999; cf. survey in Calmfors, 2000) support the 
theoretical prediction, showing a marked tendency that countries with a high degree of co-
ordination in the wage setting have lower unemployment. 
  Given the large potential benefits of co-ordination in wage setting, suggested by 
theory and supported by empirical evidence, a crucial question is: Why are unions in some 
countries able to co-ordinate their wage setting, while unions in other countries are not? This 
issue has, however, not received much attention within the economics literature (two 
exceptions are Holden and Raaum, 1991, and Holden, 1991a). As observed by Flanagan 
(1999), most studies take the labour market institutions as exogenous.
1 In contrast, this issue 
has been discussed extensively in the political science literature, cf. e.g. Iversen (1999) and 
Fajertag and Pochet (2000). 
The present paper argues that the monetary regime may be one factor that affects 
whether co-ordination of wage setting is feasible. The argument builds on a recent literature, 
including Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), Soskice and Iversen (1998, 2000) and Coricelli, 
Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000),
2, where it is shown that a non-accommodating central bank 
disciplines large wage setters by making employment more sensitive to the real wage. In the 
present paper, the result of this literature is blended with the analysis of Holden and Raaum 
(1991) and Holden (1991) on whether co-ordinated wage restraint is feasible. Somewhat 
simplified, the idea is as follows. Consider an economy with several large wage setters (e.g. 
industry unions), where uncoordinated wage setting will lead to an adverse outcome with high 
                                                
1 Cooper (1999) surveys other types of co-ordination games in macroeconomics. 
2 See also Horn and Persson (1988), Hall and Franzese (1998), Holden (1999), Wibaut (1999), 
Vartiainen (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001). In a related literature, Cubitt (1992, 
1995), Skott (1997), Jensen (1997), Gruner and Hefeker (1999), Cukierman and Lippi (1999), 
Guzzo and Velasco (1999), Lawler (2000), explore the effects of assuming that unions are 
also concerned about inflation.   3 
unemployment. Unions have an incentive to co-ordinate their wage setting to achieve lower 
unemployment. However, any union may deviate from the co-ordination, reaping a short run 
gain from setting higher wages. Co-ordination is only sustainable if the costs associated with a 
defection, in the form of reduced likelihood of a mutually beneficial co-ordination in the 
future, is sufficiently high to outweigh the potential short run gain from deviating.  
The monetary regime may influence whether co-ordination is sustainable by affecting 
the costs of a breakdown of the co-ordination. If wage setting is unionised, but uncoordinated, 
the monetary regime is important, because a strict central bank may discipline wage setters 
and thereby dampen the negative consequences of uncoordinated wage setting. The monetary 
regime is less important if unions co-ordinate their wage setting, because a good equilibrium, 
with low unemployment, can be achieved in any case.
3 Thus, the gains from co-ordination of 
wage setting are larger if the central bank is accommodating, providing unions with a greater 
incentive to co-ordinate.  
An important application of the analysis of the paper is the consequences of 
participation in a monetary union, like the European Monetary Union, EMU. As argued by 
Soskice and Iversen (1998) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001), monetary policy will not have 
the same disciplining effect on wage setting in a monetary union as in a country with a 
country-specific inflation target, implying that equilibrium unemployment will be higher in a 
monetary union. The intuition is that even if the central bank in the monetary union is a 
vigorous inflation fighter, the monetary policy response to higher wages in a single country 
would be small, because the effect on the aggregate price level in the monetary union of 
higher wages in one single country would be small. In contrast, in a country with a country-
specific inflation target, the central bank would respond to higher wages by increasing the 
interest rate, making a wage increase less attractive for the unions. However, because EMU 
involve less discipline on the unions, this paper shows that the incentives for unions to 
voluntary co-ordinate wage setting at the national level are higher in the EMU. If incentives to 
co-ordinate increase sufficiently to sustain co-ordination, membership in the EMU would lead 
to lower equilibrium unemployment.  
To focus sharply on the effect of the monetary regime on whether co-operation in 
wage setting is sustainable, the model is kept simple on other accounts. Most importantly, the 
monetary policy rule is kept exogenous in the main part of the paper. Furthermore, other 
                                                
3 This distinction is noted in Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), but without any remarks on the 
possible implications for whether co-operation is feasible. 
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possible effects of participation in a monetary union, like increased product market 
competition (Bean, 1998), a change in the incentives for labour market reform (Calmfors, 
1998), or different effects on traded and non-traded sectors (Holden, 1999), are also 
neglected.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I present the basic economic model. In 
section 3, I analyse whether co-ordination in wage setting is feasible, drawing upon the 
theoretical framework in Holden and Raaum (1991). In section 4, I explore whether the key 
empirical prediction is consistent with data. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 The  model 
We consider an economy consisting of k symmetric industries. The workers are organised in  
1 < n ≤ k symmetric unions, so that each union covers the workers in k/n industries. For 
analytical convenience, n is continuous and the limit case n = 1 is ruled out. The assumption 
that the economy is symmetric and completely unionised is done to simplify the analysis. The 
aim is to capture two important elements of European labour markets: (i) There are several 
fairly large wage setters (typically industry unions). (ii) Most wage earners have their wage 
set by these large wage setters (bargaining coverage in Western European countries was in 
1994 in the interval from 70 to 98 per cent, with two exceptions, UK 47 per cent and 
Switzerland 50 per cent, see OECD, 1997, table 3.3). 
  In the model, time horizon is infinite. We first consider behaviour in one time period, 
which I shall to refer to as a year. To save on notation, time subscript is suppressed whenever 
possible. Within each industry, there are several firms producing an identical product under 
constant returns to scale, with labour as the only input yf = lf, where lower case denotes 
natural logarithm, y is production, l is labour, and subscript indicates firm. Thus, within each 
industry there is Bertrand competition, so each firms sets the output price equal to unit costs, 
that is, 
 
(1)   pf = wf,  
 
where wf is the wage rate for workers in firm f. The demand for products from industry i is 
 
(2)  0 , ) ( ) ( > − − − + = η α η p p p m a g y i i  
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Unions care about the real wages and the employment of their members. The annual loss 
function of union j is 
 
(4) 









where ω * > 0 and lj* = l*-  lnk > 0 are the target levels of real wages and employment 
(identical across unions),  l* is the total labour force, and θ  > 0 denotes the union￿s relative 
concern for employment. (4) is only meaningful as long as both the real wage and the 
employment level are below their target values, so that union loss is decreasing in both 
arguments. However, as will become apparent below, in equilibrium the real wage will be 
below its target value, which ensures that this condition is fulfilled in the relevant interval.  
  The central bank sets the nominal money stock according to a predetermined rule 
 
(5)  w m m ρ + =     
 
where m is an exogenous component of the money supply, w is the aggregate wage level, and 
ρ  is the rate of accommodation to the wage setting. (5) allows for different interpretations. 
Coricelli et al (2000) derive a monetary rule like (5) as the optimal monetary policy of a 
central bank with a loss function that is increasing in inflation and unemployment. 
Cukierman, Rodriguez and Webb (1998) provide empirical evidence of monetary tightening 
in response to high wage growth (ie. a negative ρ ) in countries like Germany and Austria 
(which had strict monetary regimes before entering EMU). More broadly, (5) can be thought 
of as a convenient characterisation of the responsiveness of aggregate demand to the wage 
setting under different monetary regimes. Under such a broad interpretation, a regime where 
the central bank inflates or devalues so as to wipe out any real effects of the money wage 
setting of unions may correspond to ρ  = 1. In a credibly fixed exchange rate regime, or in a 
small country in a monetary union, the interest rate would not respond to wages, but aggregate   6 
demand may go down due to increased costs of production compared to the competitors, 
corresponding to a lower value of ρ . A country-specific inflation target would presumably 
correspond to a negative ρ , as excessive wage growth would be met with higher interest rates, 
possibly inducing an appreciation of the currency.  
All agents have complete knowledge of the model, and are able to perfectly forecast 
the behaviour of the other agents. Within the year, the sequence of events is as follows. First, 
all unions simultaneously set the nominal wages (to simplify the analysis, I follow the 
common practice in this literature and adopt the monopoly union assumption). Second, the 
central bank sets the nominal money stock according to the monetary rule (5). This sequence 
is motivated from the fact that most collective agreements are set for one or two years, while 
monetary policy can be adjusted at any time. Third, firms set prices and employment levels so 
as to maximise profits, ensuring that prices and employment are given by (1) and (2) above. 
Wage setting  
We first consider wage setting without co-ordination. The first order condition of union j is 
 
(6)  0 ) ( 1 *) (
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The first order conditions (6) for each union jointly determine a Nash equilibrium in the wage 
setting game among the unions. From (1)-(3), and (5), we obtain (note that dw/dwj = dp/dwj 
and that in a symmetric equilibrium dp/dpj = 1/n from (3)) 
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The two components of the wage elasticity of labour demand reflect the two channels through 
which a wage rise affects employment. First, a wage rise leads to higher prices, reducing 
aggregate demand via a reduction in the real money stock. This effect is stronger the more 
centralised the wage setting (dp/dwj large), and the less accommodating the central bank (ρ  
small). Secondly, a wage rise raises the relative price of the firms covered by the union, so 
that these firms obtain a smaller share of aggregate demand. This effect is weaker the more 
centralised the wage setting, and the lower the price elasticity of product demand.   7 
  Substituting out in (6), defining the rate of unemployment for workers associated with 
union j as uj = lj* - lj, and aggregating over industries, we obtain 
 
(8)  () u p w θ η σ ρ α ω + − − = − ) 1 ( * 
 
where I have defined σ = (dp/dwj)/(1-dp/dwj) as an indicator for centralisation of wage setting. 
Using (7), σ  = 1/(n-1), so σ  can take values in the interval 1/(k-1) (n = k, ie. decentralisation) 
to infinity (when n converges to unity).  
Inspection of (8) shows that a strict central bank, ρ  small, makes labour demand more 
elastic, inducing unions to aim for lower real wages (for given rate of unemployment) (cf. 
among others Bratsiotis and Martin, 1999, and Soskice and Iversen, 1998, 2000).  
The equilibrium rate of unemployment is derived by combining the wage curve (8) 
with the aggregate price curve implied by (2); p - w = 0. The following Proposition is 
immediate.  
 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium rate of unemployment is given by  






* u . 
 
u
*  is decreasing in θ  and η , decreasing in σ  for ρ  < 1, and increasing in ρ  and ω
* (and 
increasing in n, via the effect of σ ). 
 
In particular, we observe that equilibrium unemployment is lower, the stricter the central bank 
(ρ  small), and the more centralised the wage setting (σ  large). These are standard findings in 
the literature. A strict central bank disciplines the wage setters, cf. Bratsiotis and Martin 
(1999), Soskice and Iversen (2000), and Coricelli et al (2000). Centralisation of wage setting 
leads to internalisation of negative external effects, cf the surveys by Moene et al (1993) and 
Calmfors (1993). As the aggregate real wage level is given by productivity and price setting, 
and thus independent of the level of unemployment, union welfare is unambiguously 
decreasing in the rate of unemployment.  
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3  Co-ordination of wage setting 
While proposition 1 above shows that co-ordination of wage setting is desirable, it does not 
necessarily ensure that it is accomplished; this is the topic of this section. First, in the real 
world, it is not realistic that all income earners comply with the co-ordination; eg self-
employed and employees not covered by collective agreements. To capture this in a simple 
way, I assume that 1-γ  of the industries never participate in the co-ordination. In these 
industries, the money wage is set simultaneously with the wage setting by the co-ordinating 
unions, and the money wage is set to the value that makes the real wage in these industries 
equal to the average real wage in the economy (recall that all agents can forecast the 
equilibrium price level).  
A possible way to achieve co-ordination among the remaining γ n (assuming γ n > 2) 
unions would be joint wage setting, i.e. a nation-wide wage bargaining covering all workers in 
these unions. However, in practice, this would involve less flexibility on issues other than 
wages (e.g. manning ratios, working hours). Furthermore, joint negotiations may also reduce 
wage dispersion (see Wallerstein, 1999, for empirical evidence), which high wage industries 
may object to. Empirically, nation-wide wage setting does take place occasionally in some 
countries, however in most European countries this is rarely or never the case. 
A second possible way of ensuring co-operation would be for the unions to sign a 
binding agreement. However, this would involve important legal and other difficulties.
4 In the 
sequel, I will assume that the actual wage setting is undertaken independently be each union.  
Ahead of the wage setting, the leaders of the γ n unions are assumed to come together 
to agree on a common wage level to be chosen in the subsequent industry-wide wage setting.
5 
As wage determination takes place simultaneously in all industries, any one union can deviate 
from this agreement and set a higher wage. This will not be discovered until the other unions 
have set their wage. Thus, if the wage setting in one year is viewed in isolation, an agreement 
on wage restraint by the unions will not be credible. Each union prefers a higher wage for 
itself irrespective of the wage set by the other unions, and the unique one-shot Nash 
                                                
4 However, on rare occasions, e.g. in Norway in 1988-89, unions may accept legal restrictions 
on wage and price growth imposed by the government. 
5 Alternatively, co-ordination may be achieved by one union acting as the wage leader, by 
being the first to set wages and then choose a low wage that sets a pattern for others to follow. 
The question would then be if other unions would follow the leader, or deviate by setting a 
higher wage. By use of a similar formal analysis to the one presented here, the same 
qualitative results could be derived in this setting.   9 
equilibrium in the wage setting game among the unions is the uncoordinated equilibrium 
derived above, as given by (8) and (9) above (where σ  = 1/(n-1)), which I denote w
N(ρ ). 
However, the situation is different if wage setting in one year may affect the outcome 
in future years. Intuitively, one would expect unions to be more willing to stick to the 
agreement if other unions have done so in the past. Thus, unions may want to stick to the 
agreement so as to induce the other unions to co-operate in the future. To explore this idea 
more formally, we must specify the overall objective of a representative union j, which is to 
minimise the discounted sum of annual losses 
 
(10)     1 0
0









where β  is the discount factor reflecting the rate of time preference. 
The game can now be analysed as a repeated game, where the annual wage setting is 
repeated each year. Consider the following strategy for the unions: 
 
1.  Co-operate by setting w
A until some union alone deviates from co-operation.  
2.  If some union alone has ever deviated from co-operation, then set w
N(ρ ) until an 
exogenous event Q takes place. 
 
For the time being, w
A is any given wage involving restraint relative to the uncoordinated 
outcome, w
A < w
N(ρ ), with associated unemployment u
A < u
N(ρ ); w
A is discussed further 
below. The exogenous event Q can be associated with a macroeconomic shock that makes the 
unions ￿forget￿ a previous defection and resume a co-operative solution (cf. discussion 
below). Let 1-q be the probability that Q happens, where 0 < q < 1.  
Thus, if one of the unions deviates from the co-ordination, the co-ordination breaks 
down and the unions revert to the one-shot Nash equilibrium. A unilateral deviation from the 
co-operative agreement will be disadvantageous for the deviator if it incurs higher (or equal) 
discounted total loss by deviating from the agreed wage, inducing a reversion to the 
uncoordinated one-shot Nash equilibrium, than by sticking to the agreement. This condition is 
equivalent to (cf appendix) 
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D denotes the annual loss of a union that deviates by setting a higher wage than w
A, 
while the other unions set w
A. Ω
A denotes the associated payoffs of the co-operating unions, 
while the annual loss of the unions under uncoordinated wage setting is Ω
N. The numerator on 
the left hand side of (11) indicates the reduced loss for a deviator in the year of deviation, 
while the denominator indicates the higher annual loss in subsequent years. The appropriate 
discount factor δ  incorporates both unions￿ time preference β  and the probability of co-
ordination being resumed after a breakdown, 1-q.  
We now consider how the monetary regime, ρ , affects the decision to deviate. When 
comparing across regimes I treat the unemployment rate associated with the agreement, u
A,   
as constant; the question is how the monetary regime affects whether an agreement involving 
a certain unemployment rate is sustainable. Consider first the gain from co-ordination. As the 
equilibrium real wage is independent of the wage setting (it is given by the productivity 
level), the difference in union losses -(Ω
A - Ω
N) only depends on the difference in the 
associated equilibrium rates of unemployment. Using (4), the gain from co-operation is  
 
(12)         -(Ω
A - Ω
N) = - ( θ (u
A)




A tighter monetary regime (a smaller ρ ) reduces the rate of unemployment under 
uncoordinated wage setting, u
N, thus reducing the loss under uncoordinated wage setting and 
also reducing the gains from co-ordination.  
Then consider the instantaneous gain from a unilateral deviation from a co-operative 
agreement, ie. -(Ω
D - Ω
A). Although the co-operative agreement is non-binding, it seems 
realistic that it poses some constraints on a deviator. I assume that a deviator sets the wage ∆  
> 0 above the agreed wage (the value of ∆  does not matter for the qualitative results). The 
reduction in loss from a unilateral marginal increase of the wage above the co-operative wage 
w
A is (cf. (6) and (7)) 
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It is apparent from (13) that dΩ
D/dwj  < 0 for u
A < u
N (because dΩ
D/dwj  = 0 for the one-shot 
Nash equilibrium u
N). This implies that if a union deviates, it will set a higher wage than the 
agreed w




D/dwj, we obtain  
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We have (cf. appendix) 
 
Proposition 2:  
(i)  There exists a unique critical value δ
A(ρ , u
A) ∈  (0,1), given by equality in (14), 
such that co-operation involving u
A < u
N is sustainable as a subgame perfect 
equilibrium under the strategy defined above if and only if δ  ≥  δ
A(ρ , u
A).  
(ii)  The partial derivatives of δ
A satisfy ∂δ
A(ρ , u
A)/∂ρ  < 0 and ∂δ
A(ρ , u
A)/∂u
A < 0. 

















) , ( lim . Moreover, ∂δ
Min/∂ρ  < 0. 
 
Proposition 2 (i) says that co-ordination of wage setting is sustainable if unions are 
sufficiently patient, and/or the probability that co-operation is resumed after a breakdown is 
not too large. Proposition 2 (ii) can be given two different applications. First, for a given 
possible agreement involving the unemployment rate u
A, a less strict monetary regime (higher 
ρ ) leads to a lower critical value δ
A, implying that co-ordination is sustainable for less patient 
unions (β  smaller), and/or a higher likelihood that co-operation is resumed after a breakdown 
(1-q larger). In other words, a less strict monetary regime facilitates co-ordination of wage 
setting. Secondly, as δ
A is monotonic in u
A and ρ , the function δ
A(.) can be inverted to give u
A 
as a function of δ , u
A(δ , ρ ), where ∂u
A(δ , ρ )/∂δ  = 1/(∂δ
A(ρ , u
A)/∂u
A) < 0, and ∂u
A(δ , ρ )/∂ρ  < 0.   12 
This implies that for a given discount factor δ  of the unions, a less strict monetary regime 
(higher ρ ) makes unions able to sustain an agreement involving a lower unemployment. 
  Part (iii) of Proposition 3 says that the lowest critical value for which any agreement 
on wage restraint is sustainable, δ
Min, is a decreasing function of ρ . Again, a more 
accommodating monetary regime facilitates co-ordinated wage restraint. 
  The intuition for these results is a follows. The monetary regime ρ  affects both the 
gain from deviation and the costs of a breakdown. A less strict monetary regime increases the 
short run gain from a deviation, because the negative effect on employment associated with a 
wage rise is mitigated. However, a less strict monetary regime increases the costs associated 
with a breakdown of the agreement, because the rate of unemployment under uncoordinated 
wage setting is higher. The latter effect dominates the former; so that the overall effect is that 
a less strict monetary regime makes a deviation less attractive. Intuitively, the effect on the 
short run gain from deviation is only related to the wage setting of the deviator, whereas the 
effect on the loss of a breakdown is related to the wage setting of all unions, so that the latter 
effect is larger. The feature that a less strict monetary regime makes deviation less attractive 
implies that the same agreement is sustainable under a wider range of circumstances (i.e. a 
lower δ ), and that a more ambitious agreement is sustainable (a lower u
A).  
  An inherent problem in repeated games is that there typically exist a large or infinite 
number of equilibria. The multiplicity is related to the choice of initial agreement (see 
discussion below), as well as to the consequences of a deviation. Concerning the latter, one 
line of criticism of trigger strategy equilibria has been that the punishment is not 
"renegotiation proof", in the sense that if a deviation were to occur, the unions would 
nevertheless have an incentive to co-operate in the following period. If unions were to 
anticipate that they would co-operate even after a deviation, a deviation would involve no 
costs, and in this case the co-operation would not be sustainable in the first place (Farrell and 
Maskin, 1989). Another line of criticism is that even if co-ordination is not sustainable under 
the punishment associated with a reversion to a one-shot Nash equilibrium, there may exist 
harsher punishment strategies that sustain co-ordination (Abreu, 1988). 
 However, these lines of criticisms are probably more relevant in an analysis of 
perfectly rational players than in a model of union behaviour. Union wage policy is restricted 
by what can be accepted by the rank and file. It would be very difficult for the leadership of a 
union to suggest wage moderation if another union had defected the previous year. Arguments 
like "Last year was a mistake, but they promise that this year￿." will probably have trouble   13 
convincing the members of the union.
6 Likewise, complicated punishment profiles would also 
be difficult to explain and win acceptance for among the members. Thus, I find it more 
realistic to use a framework where a defection from the co-operative agreement leads to the 
uncoordinated outcome, and then reduced likelihood that there will be co-ordination in the 
future. Ideally, one would want a more elaborate model where the distinction between union 
leaders and membership were explicit, but this is outside the scope of the present study.  
Optimal co-ordination 
So far, we have only considered the sustainability of an arbitrary agreement on wage restraint. 
Let w
C(ρ ) denote the wage level that minimises the joint loss of the co-operating unions given 
that they stick to their agreement, which I will refer to as optimal co-ordination. w
C is given 
by (8) and (9), using dp/dwj = γ  so that σ  = γ /(1-γ ). Let u
C and Ω
C be the associated rate of 
unemployment and annual loss of the co-operating unions, given by (9) and (4). Considering 
the optimal agreement involves the additional complexity that the agreement itself depends on 
the monetary regime. Let δ * denote the critical value for the discount factor above which an 
agreement on w
C(ρ ) is sustainable, given by equality in (14) where u
A is replaced by u
C. We 
have the following Proposition.  
 
Proposition 3:  
(i)  There is a unique value ρ * < 1, such that the gain from co-operation, -(Ω
C - Ω
N), 
has a maximum for ρ *, is increasing in ρ  for ρ <ρ * and decreasing in ρ  for ρ >ρ *.  
(ii)  The reduction in loss from a marginal deviation from a co-operative agreement 
w
C(ρ ) (i.e. the gain from deviation, -(dΩ
D/dwj)) is smaller, the greater is ρ .  
(iii) For  ρ  < ρ *, δ * is decreasing in ρ  (as the gain from co-ordination increases and the 
gain from deviation decrease, both effects reducing δ *). For ρ  > ρ *, a rise in ρ  
reduces the gain from co-ordination, so there are two opposing effects, and the 
effect on δ * is ambiguous.  
 
                                                
6 As an illustration, in the wage settlement in 2000, the LO members in Norway rejected a 
moderage agreement proposed by their leaders, leading to new negotiations and a revised 
agreement on a higher wage. High income growth for other groups played an important role 
in the debate among LO members prior to the ballot. 
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The difference from the results in Proposition 2 above is a consequence of the agreement 
itself being affected by the monetary regime. As for part (i) of Proposition 3, the non-
monotonicity arises from the monetary regime affecting both the loss under co-ordination and 
the loss without coordination, and the overall effect depends on which is the more sensitive to 
the monetary regime. Part (ii) also reflects two opposing effects. As explained above, a higher 
value of ρ  reduces the elasticity of labour demand, which implies that a wage rise has less 
negative effect on employment; this increases the gain from a deviation. On the other hand, a 
higher value of ρ  increases unemployment under co-ordination, so that unemployment is 
farther from its target value, which reduces the gain from a deviation. The latter effect is 
related to the wage setting of all unions, and thus dominates the former that only affects the 
wage setting of a deviator. Hence a higher ρ  reduces the gain from a deviation. 
To sum up Propositions 1-3: If δ  ≥ δ *, unions choose the optimal agreement w
C(ρ ), as it is 
sustainable, involving unemployment u
C(ρ ). Within this interval, higher ρ  leads to higher 
unemployment (du
C/dρ  > 0), as a more accommodating regime makes the unions show less 
wage moderation (the discipline effect of Proposition 1). If  δ
Min ≤ δ  < δ *, unions minimize 
their loss by choosing the agreement associated with the lowest possible unemployment that is 
sustainable, u
A(δ ; ρ ) > u
C. Here, higher ρ  leads to lower unemployment (du
A(δ ; ρ )/dρ  < 0), as 
a more accommodating regime makes unions able to sustain a more moderate agreement 
(greater  incentive for co-ordination, cf. Proposition 2). If δ  < δ
Min, co-ordinated wage 
restraint is not sustainable. The outcome will be the uncoordinated equilibrium u
N, and higher 
ρ  leads to lower unemployment, as du
N/dρ  < 0 (the discipline effect).  
In addition, the monetary regime shifts the positions of the intervals: higher ρ  leads to 
lower δ * (numerical simulations below indicate that this also holds in the case where the 
analytical result of Prop 3 (iii) above is ambiguous) and to lower δ
Min. This implies that under 
a more accommodating monetary regime, co-ordination is possible for less patient unions 
(lower δ ), and unions may agree to co-ordination involving lower unemployment. 
Numerical simulations of the model are presented in Table 1. Because of the highly 
stylised nature of the model, the simulations should be treated as illustrations only, and not as 
estimates with any claim to precision. For the sake of brevity, and to avoid repetition of the 
results of Propositions 1-3 above, I will only mention two specific examples.  
Consider the basis model (the four columns to the left of the Table), and let the actual 
discount factor, δ  = 0.3. Under an accommodative regime, ρ  = 0.5, optimal co-ordination is 
sustainable (as 0.3 > δ *(0.5) =0.226), involving unemployment u
C(0.5) = 0.038. A stricter   15 
regime ρ  = 0 leads to lower equilibrium unemployment, u
C(0) = 0.020, as optimal co-
ordination is still sustainable. However, if the monetary regime became even stricter, ρ  = -0.5, 
co-ordination on w
C(ρ ) would no longer be sustainable as 0.3 < δ *(-0.5)=0.338. The lowest 
possible unemployment that would be sustainable in this case is u
A(0.3, -0.5) = 0.049.  
If δ  = 0.2 in the basis model, optimal co-ordination w
C is sustainable for ρ = 0.8 (as 
δ *(0.8)=0.179 < 0.2), implying unemployment u
C(0.8) = 0.077. For ρ  = 0.5, optimal co-
ordination is not sustainable (δ *(0.5)> 0.2), and the lowest possible sustainable 
unemployment is u
A(0.2, 0.5) = 0.079. For ρ  = -0.5, co-ordination is not sustainable, as δ
Min(-
0.5) > 0.2 , and the outcome is the uncoordinated equilibrium u
N(-0.5) = 0.17. The overall 
result that a stricter monetary regime involves less co-ordination of wage setting is still valid.  
Endogenous monetary policy 
In this subsection I briefly make one observation regarding implications if monetary policy 
were endogenous. A possible objection to the analysis above is that if co-ordination for some 
reason breaks down, the central bank will be tempted to switch to a stricter policy, to avoid 
the high equilibrium unemployment associated with uncoordinated wage setting under 
accommodating monetary policy. However, this outcome is not obvious. The central bank 
must also take into consideration that a switch to a stricter policy may prevent co-ordination 
from being resumed even if the exogenous event Q takes place. In the appendix, I show that 
under certain circumstances, a central bank that is sufficiently patient may want to remain 
accommodating if co-ordination breaks down, so as to make co-ordination possible in the 
future, rather than reaping a gain in the short run by switching to a stricter regime, but 
precluding future co-ordination. 
 
4  Some empirical evidence  
The main empirical prediction of this paper is that wage setting is less likely to be co-
ordinated (or with much less ambitious co-ordination) in countries with a strict monetary 
policy. Now both co-ordination in wage setting and the strictness of monetary policy are in 
practice rather complex concepts that are difficult to measure empirically. A host of different 
empirical measures exists. Regarding wage setting, various scholars have focussed on 
corporatism, centralisation or co-ordination (see discussion of empirical measures in OECD, 
1997). Note that the finding in section 3 above that the gain from co-ordination depends on 
the monetary regime may also be used to explain the degree of centralisation: centralisation   16 
may involve costs in the form of reduced flexibility and independence, but unions may 
nevertheless prefer centralisation if the costs of uncoordinated wage setting are too large. In 
addition, combinations may occur where some unions may choose joint negotiations 
(centralisation), and then co-ordinate with independent unions. A striking feature for both 
wage setting and monetary regime is that the ranking of countries is often rather sensitive to 
the operational definition that is chosen. 
  Due to the large problems associated with empirical measurement, a robust 
investigation requires an extensive study of the relationship between different specifications 
of both concepts. This is outside the scope of the present study. It is nevertheless of interest to 
explore the relationship between the monetary regime and the co-ordination/centralisation of 
wage setting using some of the indices suggested in the literature. Figure 1 shows the position 
of 15 OECD countries on centralisation in wage setting (CeTI) and hard currency regimes 
(HCI), based on data from Iversen (1999). Some countries have a very decentralised wage 
setting (observations to the left in the figure), often with small union density, and in most of 
these countries co-ordination of wage setting is not an issue irrespective of monetary regime 
(UK/Britain, US and Canada are clearly in this category). However, for the observations of 
countries with medium and high degree of centralisation of wage setting, there is a clear 
tendency that a softer currency is associated with more centralised wage setting. A linear 
regression of centralisation of wage setting on the hard currency index omitting UK/Britain, 
US and Canada reveals a negative but insignificant effect (Table 2, regression 1).
7 However, 
omitting the five countries with most decentralised wage setting (which statistically is 
problematic; regression 2), we obtain a negative effect of the hard currency index significant 
at the ten percent level. This is consistent with the prediction of the present paper, that wage 
setting is more likely to be co-ordinated in countries with an accommodating monetary policy.  
  Figure 2, which plots the relationship between co-ordination in wage setting 
(CoOECD) in a number of OECD - countries, 1990 (from OECD, 1997, table 3.3) and the 
index of central bank independence (CBI) given by Cukierman and Lippi (1999), provides a 
less encouraging picture. No clear relationship is identifiable, irrespective of whether one 
neglects the countries with completely decentralised wage setting (regression 3). On the other 
hand, Figure 3, which combines Iversen’s (1999) hard currency index with the centralisation 
of wage setting index of Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (1998) (CeGWL), indicates a clear 
                                                
7 Cross-country regressions with few observations is statistically highly problematic, so the 
results should only be interpreted as indicative. 
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relationship: wage setting is more centralised in countries with weaker currencies (neglecting 
US, Canada and UK); this is confirmed by a linear regression excluding the same three 
countries, where the hard currency index has a negative effect significant at the five percent 
level (regression 4). Figure 4, where Golden, Lange and Wallerstein’s centralisation index is 
combined with Cukierman and Lippi’s central bank independence index provides the same 
picture: centralised wage setting is combined with low central bank independence. The effect 
is significant at 10 percent level (regressions 5 and 6).  
  Overall, most of these indexes appear to be consistent with the theoretical prediction 
of the present paper. Note however, that even if we were to find a strong relationship between 
co-ordination in wage setting and accommodating monetary policy, the direction of causality 
would be an open issue. Clearly, the problems associated with the combination of unionised, 
uncoordinated wage setting and an accommodating monetary regime may also lead to a 
switch to a stricter monetary regime.  
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
In this paper I have argued that the monetary regime affects whether co-ordinated wage 
restraint is feasible.
8 Because of the existence of negative external effects in wage setting, 
unions have an incentive to agree on wage moderation. However, individual unions may 
deviate from the co-operative solution, obtaining a short run gain by increasing wages. Co-
ordination is only sustainable if the long-run costs associated with a breakdown of co-
ordination outweigh the short run gains from a deviation. This depends on unions’ discount 
factor (co-ordination is more likely if unions are patient), but it also depends on the monetary 
regime. A strict monetary regime disciplines wage setters by increasing the wage elasticity of 
employment, thus dampening the negative consequences of uncoordinated wage setting. 
Uncoordinated wage setting has more detrimental effects if the central bank is 
accommodating, implying that the gains from co-ordination are greater. Thus, co-ordination 
in wage setting may be sustainable with an accommodating central bank even if unions are 
not patient enough to ensure co-ordination with a stricter central bank. 
The predicted negative relationship between centralisation of wage setting and central 
bank strictness is apparent from several combinations of empirical indices used in the 
literature. However, caution is necessary because empirical measurement of systems of wage   18 
setting and monetary regimes is difficult, and because there also exists specifications of co-
ordination/centralisation of wage setting and of monetary regimes where there is no 
relationship. Yet, the broad view appears to be consistent with the prediction that wage setting 
is less likely to be co-ordinated in countries with a strict monetary policy. 
  An interesting possible application of the analysis concerns the effects of membership 
within a Monetary Union, like the European Monetary Union EMU. Within a monetary 
union, the common monetary policy is only marginally related to the wage setting in an 
individual country, simply because one country constitutes a too small part of the total union 
to have a sizeable effect the aggregate variables. As pointed out by Soskice and Iversen 
(1998) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001), monetary policy will for this reason not have the 
same discipline effect within a Monetary Union as in a country with a country-specific 
inflation target. More speculatively, one may also argue that the lack of credibility of many 
fixed exchange rate regimes to some extent have disciplined wage setters, because high wage 
increases led to devaluation expectations and higher interest rates (see Holden and Vikłren, 
1996, and Bernhardsen, 2000, for supporting empirical evidence for many European countries 
during the 1980s and early 1990s). On the argument of the present paper, the reduced 
discipline effect of interest rates being less responsive to wage growth in one country, leading 
to higher equilibrium unemployment if wage setting remains uncoordinated, may in fact 
increase wage setters￿ incentive to co-ordinate. This argument is interesting in view of the 
recent emergence of social pacts in many European countries over the last decade; Ireland, 
Italy, Greece, Finland, Belgium, Spain and Portugal are some examples (Pochet and Fajertag, 
2000), a tendency not least surprising in light of the movement towards weaker unions and 
more decentralisation of wage setting that takes place in many countries. While there are 
clearly several reasons for this evolution (cf. Fajertag and Pochet, 2000), an interesting topic 
                                                                                                                                                   
8 A broader discussion of the circumstances that may induce co-ordination of wage setting is 
given in Holden and Raaum (1991).   19 
for future research would be to explore the relationship with the change in monetary regimes 
at a more detailed basis.
9 
                                                
9 An additional reason for why membership in the EMU may facilitate co-ordination in wage 
setting is that devaluation is no longer feasible (see also related arguments in Pochet and 
Fajertag, 2000, and Calmfors, 2000). If money wages are rigid downwards (see Holden, 1994, 
2001, for a theoretical justification based on existing labour market laws and regulations, and 
references to corroborating empirical evidence), excessive real wage costs arising from a 
breakdown of a co-operative agreement may be more persistent, and thus more costly, within 
the EMU. This would make defection from a co-operative outcome less beneficial, thus 
facilitating co-ordination. In the present paper, there are no nominal rigidities, so this effect is 
not incorporated.   20 
Appendix 
Derivation of (11): 
The discounted sum of annual losses for a union that sticks to the agreement is Ω
A/(1-β ). The 
discounted, expected sum of annual losses for a deviating union is Ω















A + .. which can be rewritten as 
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(11) follows from Ω
A/(1-β ) ≤ (A1). 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
(i)The existence of a unique critical value leading to a subgame perfect equilibrium follows 
directly from the standard analysis of trigger strategy equilibria, cf Friedman (1986).            
(ii) To derive the partial derivatives, let  
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From (14) it is apparent that sign(∂δ
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A < 0. 
To prove that ∂δ
A(ρ , u
A)/∂ρ  < 0, note first that b is a decreasing function of ρ . We take 
the partial derivative of F with respect to b, using that u
N = a/b, to obtain 
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thus ∂F/∂b > 0 for u
A < a/b, which completes the proof that ∂δ
A(ρ , u
A)/∂ρ < 0. 












) , ( lim . Substituting out in (14) and 
solving for δ , yields (iii). 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
(i)Using (4), the gain from co-operation is  
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Substituting out for the associated equilibrium rates of unemployment using (9), simplifying, 
and differentiating with respect to ρ , we obtain 
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and (i) is immediate. (It￿s straightforward to show that the expression to the right > 0 by 
invoking γ n > 2). 
 
 
(ii) The effect of the monetary regime on the gain from a marginal deviation is found by 
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Substituting out for u
C from (9) (where σ  = γ /(1-γ )), using that du
C/dρ  = u
Cασ /(α (1-ρ )σ +η ), 
we obtain 
 























(A10) is greater than zero whenever γ  > 1/n, which holds as γ n > 2. As dw
C/dwj < 0, the 
absolute value of dw
C/dwj is decreasing in ρ .      QED 
(iii) Follows from (i) and (ii). 
 
Endogenous monetary policy 






S) > δ  > δ *(ρ
A), so that optimal co-ordination is sustainable under ρ
A, while no co-
ordination is sustainable under ρ




CA, corresponding to the ranking of the associated unemployment rates 
under non-coordination and co-ordination. Assume that ρ
A prevails, but then co-ordination 
breaks down and the central bank is tempted to switch to ρ
S so as to avoid very high   22 
equilibrium unemployment (reduce costs from L
NA to L
NS). I want to show strategies ensuring 
that a patient central bank will not switch (cf similar analysis in Holden (1991)) (note that 





C if and only if  
(i)  the central bank has always played ρ
A, and 











The discounted sum of annual losses for a central bank that switches to ρ
S is L
NS/(1-λ), where 
λ is the discount factor. The discounted, expected sum of annual losses for a central bank that 
maintains ρ
A is L
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CA + .. which can be rewritten as 
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NS, we know that (A11) < L
NS/(1-λ) for λ sufficiently close to unity, ie the central 
bank will stick to ρ
A if it is sufficiently patient.            QED  23 
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Figure 1: Sources: Iversen (1999), tables 1.2 and 1.3. Aus is Austria, NL the Netherlands, and 
NZ is New Zealand. 
 
 
Figure 2: Sources: CBI, Cukierman and Lippi (1999), table 1; co-ordination in wage setting 
1990, OECD (1997) table 3.3. A is Australia. Finland and Sweden are at the same data point.  
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Figure 3: Sources: Wage setting, Golden-Wallerstein-Lange Labor & Political Data. Hard 
currency index, Iversen (1999), tables 1.3. 
 
 
Figure 4: Sources: Wage setting, Golden-Wallerstein-Lange Labor & Political Data. CBI, 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999), table 1. Finland and Sweden are at the same data point. 
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  Basis Basis Basis Basis η =1  η =1  γ  = 0.7  γ  = 0.7  n=10 n=10 
ρ   -0.500 0.000 0.500 0.800 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.500  0.000  0.500 
δ
*(ρ )  0.338 0.285 0.226 0.179 0.357 0.296 0.248 0.189  0.255  0.221 
u
C(ρ )  0.014 0.020 0.038 0.077 0.020 0.036 0.064 0.102  0.020  0.038 
u
N(ρ )  0.170 0.190 0.216 0.235 0.160 0.178 0.190 0.216  0.220  0.234 
-(Ω
C-Ω
N)  0.014 0.018 0.023 0.025 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.018  0.024  0.027 
-dΩ (w
C)/dwj  0.0073 0.0071 0.0066 0.0054 0.0070 0.0064 0.0053 0.0042  0.0082  0.0075 
u




0.049       -        -       -  0.073       -  -      -  -         - 
ρ
* 
0.775  0.775    0.775   0.775  0.718  0.718  0.510  0.510  0.687  0.687 
Table 1: Numerical simulations in Excel showing the effect of the degree of monetary 
accommodation ρ  on the critical value for the discount factor, δ *, unemployment (u) and 
union loss (Ω ) under uncoordinated (N) and co-ordinated (C) wage setting. u
A(δ , ρ ) is the 
lowest rate of unemployment associated with co-ordination, cf explanation in the main text. 
u
A(δ , ρ ) is not calculated for δ  > δ *, as the optimal agreement w
C then is sustainable, or for δ  
< δ
Min, when no agreement is sustainable. ρ * is the value for the monetary regime that 
maximises the gain from co-operation, as defined in Prop 3. The top row indicates difference 
from basis model. The simulations are based on equations (9), (13) and (14), where ∆=0.05 
(the value of ∆  does not matter for the qualitative results)). The basis model has the following 








CeTI is the centralisation of wage setting index 1983-94 from Iversen (1999), HCI is the Hard 
Currency Index 1983-94 from Iversen (1999), CoOECD is the Co-ordination of wage setting 
index, 1990, of OECD (1997, table 3.3), CBI is the Central Bank Independence index of 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999), CeGWL is the Centralization of wage setting index, 1990, of 
Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (1998). Regressions 1 and 2 correspond to fig 1; reg 3 to fig 2; 
reg 4 to fig 3; and reg 5 and 6 to fig 4. 
Regression  Const  Coef  T- coef  Adj R
2  # Obs  Omitted countries 
1: CeTI on HCI  0.40  -0.13  0.42  -0.08  12  UK, US, Can 
2: CeTI on HCI  0.60  -0.43  2.05  0.26  10  UK, US, Can, Fra, Ita 
3: CoOECD on CBI  1.83  0.95  1.23  0.03  16  UK, US, Can 
4: CeGWL on HCI  4.45  -3.76  3.09  0.44  12  UK, US, Can 
5: CeGWL on CBI  3.25  -2.53  1.96  0.16  16   
6: CeGWL on CBI  3.36  -2.08  1.95  0.19  13  UK, US, Can 
        